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ABSTRACT 
A number of academics, journalists and political elites claim that Irish neutrality is a ‘myth’, 
and many also characterise public support for Irish neutrality as ‘confused’ and 
‘nonrational’. This ‘unneutral’ discourse in the academic literature and mainstream Irish 
media is based on an academic thesis, that of an Unneutral Ireland. The Unneutral thesis 
constructs a particular concept of neutrality in order to draw its conclusion that Ireland is 
‘unneutral’. Using a poststructuralist approach—a rarity in the discipline of International 
Relations (IR)—this paper deconstructs concepts of Irish neutrality using a framework of IR 
theories. The results show that the concept of neutrality put forward in the Unneutral Ireland 
thesis and the dominant discourses on Irish neutrality are based on a hegemonic IR theory, 
the theory of neorealism, rather than on seemingly ‘objective’ scientific research methods. 
The paper concludes that non-realist theories and approaches may provide a better 
understanding of Irish neutrality and of the dynamics of public support for Irish neutrality.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
This paper is concerned with the on-going political struggle over the meaning and status of 
Irish neutrality that is articulated in the Irish media through newspaper articles and 
interviews, and in the academic literature in Political Science and International Relations 
(IR). There has been a noticeable theme in this literature and in the media over the years, in 
support of the claim that Irish neutrality has never existed—that Irish neutrality is a ‘myth’. 
This prominent discourse is based on an academic thesis that claims, on the basis of 
scientific, objective research, to have proven that Ireland is ‘unneutral’. Using the 
poststructuralist method of deconstruction, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate that these 
‘truths’ about Irish neutrality are not ‘objective’, scientific facts, as has been claimed. Rather, 
the ‘unneutral’ thesis is based on a number of ideological assumptions from the hegemonic 
IR theoretical worldview known as neorealism. Breaking this realist monopoly of ‘truth’ on 
the meaning and status of Irish neutrality has the effect of raising the alternative, subjugated 
theses supporting Irish neutrality onto a more legitimate plane. A theoretically effervescent 
debate on Irish neutrality also paves the way for a better understanding of public attitudes to 
Irish neutrality and provides space for the consideration of alternative formulations of 
Ireland’s neutrality policy.  
Research guided by the theoretical approach known as ‘poststructuralism’ is rarely 
undertaken in political science or IR
1 
and is normally met with hostility—as Der Derian puts 
it, ‘not so long ago mental flak jackets were de rigueur if one so much as uttered the “P-
word” among IR scholars’.
2 
So why should academics bother engaging with poststructuralist 
deconstruction and why should it be practised on concepts of Irish neutrality? Given most 
readers’ lack of familiarity with the approach, the current paper will briefly describe the 
premises of poststructuralism (with the issues of ontology and epistemology noted, but not 
heavily discussed) before outlining the nuts and bolts of the deconstruction process. Book-
ending these explanations, the paper will outline the academic and political puzzle that 
provided the impetus and justification for the paper, and also will provide details of the 
qualitative and quantitative hegemony of the ‘unneutral’ discourse on Irish neutrality. The 
paper will then proceed to strategically summarise the IR theoretical framework of 
understanding, namely the assumptions of neorealism and social constructivism, and to 
implement the deconstruction by linking these IR theoretical assumptions to the truth claims 
made about Irish neutrality in the texts. Consequences for elite discourses in the academic 
literature and print media, research approaches employed in academic studies of Irish 
neutrality, the formulation of Irish foreign policy and the status of Irish neutrality and public 
opinion flowing from the deconstruction inform the conclusion.  
 
THE DISCOURSE ON IRISH NEUTRALITY AND PUBLIC OPINION  
The impetus to write this paper stemmed from a prior research question concerning the 
‘rationality’ of public opinion on Irish neutrality. The definition of a ‘rational’ public means 
that members of the public choose a foreign policy suited to their needs and in accordance 
with their values.3 Research into public voting behaviour in Irish referendums on European 
Union treaties—Maastricht and Amsterdam in the 1990s, and the Nice Treaty in June 2001 
and October 2002—has shown that a proportion of Irish citizens have repeatedly voted to 
reject the treaties due to a perception that they represented threats to Irish neutrality.4 
Opinion polls conducted in the 1980s and 1990s have shown that nearly two-thirds of the 
Irish population want to retain Irish neutrality.5 According to the White Paper on foreign 
policy, ‘the majority of the Irish people have always cherished Ireland’s military neutrality 
and recognise the positive values that inspire it’.6 And so it appears that a significant 
proportion of the Irish population supports Irish neutrality, and elites and academics seem 
prepared to acknowledge this phenomenon, despite a seeming lack of understanding of the 
dynamics of public support for Irish neutrality.7  
                                                 
1 Molly Cochran, Normative theory in international relations (Cambridge, 1999), 121–22.  
2 James Der Derian, ‘Post-Theory: the eternal return of ethics in international relations’, in Michael W. Doyle and 
G. John Ikenberry (eds), New thinking in international relations theory (Boulder, 1997), 54–76: 57. (Hereafter 
cited as ‘Post-Theory’.)  
3 Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The rational public (Chicago, 1992), 35. 
4 Richard Sinnott, Attitudes and behaviour of the Irish electorate in the referendum on the Treaty of Nice (Dublin, 
2001). 
5 Michael Marsh, Irish public opinion on neutrality and the European Union (Dublin, 1992), 6. (Hereafter cited 
as Irish public opinion.)  
6 Government of Ireland, White Paper on foreign policy (Dublin, 1996), 118. 
7 No survey designed to understand public attitudes to Irish neutrality has ever been conducted. More specifically, 
in the context of voters rejecting EU treaties due to perceived threats to neutrality, ‘there have been no surveys 
which have systematically explored the various options for a new security and defence policy, or the ways in 
which neutrality might be consistent with such options’, see Marsh, Irish public opinion, 25. 
In terms of formulating a research question to evaluate the ‘rationality’ of the dynamics of 
public opinion on Irish neutrality, the combination of these two hypotheses—(a) that Irish 
neutrality is a myth and (b) that a significant proportion of the voting public supports Irish 
neutrality—raises the spectre of attempting to justify research into the phenomenon of strong 
public commitment to a concept that doesn’t exist. This has several implications, including 
(1) public opinion is ‘nonrational’ according to academic standards, or (2) the academic 
discourse claiming that Ireland’s neutrality is a myth does not reflect ‘rational’ public 
opinion. Certainly, most of the academic and elite comments on public support for Irish 
neutrality appear to favour the first implication, variously describing it as ‘emotional’,8 
‘sentimental’,9 ‘contradictory’10 —effectively nonrational.11 However, consideration of the 
second implication raises the question of whether adherence to the ‘unneutral’ discourse 
prompts a scathing view of public opinion on Irish neutrality—some evidence points to this 
possibility, e.g. one of the elites promoting the ‘unneutral’ thesis also characterises public 
opinion supporting Irish neutrality as ‘confused’.12  Alternatively, the two implications could 
be reconciled through a supposition that each is based on a different IR theoretical 
worldview and a correspondingly different concept of neutrality. It was the desire to test this 
supposition that led to the task of deconstructing the Unneutral thesis that claims Irish 
neutrality is a ‘myth’.  
 
THE PREMISES AND METHODS OF POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND DECONSTRUCTION 
 
Poststructuralism  
Despite noting the disposition of mainstream IR to dismiss poststructuralism by polemic, or 
to ignore it through arrogance, Der Derian suggests that even the ‘epistemologically 
challenged’ might recognise the recent and rapid changes in ‘international, intertextual, 
interhuman relations’ in the world producing new discourses and ‘realities’ that demand 
poststructuralist readings.13  Much of the aforementioned hostility towards poststructuralism 
stems from the fact that poststructuralist research entails operating under different 
ontological and epistemological assumptions to the dominant approach in IR of 
philosophical realism.14 However, there are indications that poststructuralism will become 
                                                 
8 Patrick Keatinge, ‘Odd man out? Irish neutrality and European security’, International Affairs 48 (1972), 438–
49: 439, 440. See also Patrick Keatinge, A place among the nations: issues of Irish foreign policy (Dublin, 1978), 
73, and his The formulation of Irish foreign policy (Dublin, 1973), 174. 
9 Gerry McMahon ‘Given her historical reticence will Ireland ever play a full part in European security?’, 
British–Irish security lecture series (Aberdeen, 1999). 
10 Richard Sinnott, ‘Poll shows a symbolic support for neutrality’, Irish Times, 5 October 1996. 
11Philip Everts, ‘Public opinion after the Cold War: a paradigm shift’, in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert  
Y. Shapiro, and Pieranglo Isernia (eds), Decisionmaking in a glass house: mass media, public opinion and 
American and European foreign policy in the 21st century (New York, 2000), 177–94: 178–9. 
12 Garret FitzGerald, ‘Neutrality concept retains potency yet is ambiguous’, Irish Times, 19 October. 
13 Der Derian, ‘Post-Theory’, 55–6. 
14 Ontology is the philosophical theory of being or existence. Ontological positions can be identified in 
relation to a central question: ‘does the world exist independently of agents’ perception or experience 
of it (objectively), or does it only exist in virtue of these factors (subjectively)?’ See Joseph Jupille, 
‘Knowing Europe: metatheory and methodology in European Union studies’, in Michelle Cini and 
Angela Bourne (eds), Palgrave advances in European Union studies (New York, 2005), 209–32: 210. 
Epistemology is the philosophical theory of knowing or knowledge ( Jupille, ‘Knowing Europe’, 211), 
often defined as ‘the study of how we claim to know something’. See Steve Smith, ‘Reflectivist and 
more acceptable in the future as the need to address ontological and epistemological issues in 
academic research becomes more widely understood, with a parallel move away from 
positivism towards recognising the need to focus on metatheory in discourses. As Cochran 
argues,  
all theory in International Relations (IR) is normative theory. By this I mean that even 
those engaged in positivist approaches, who aim to study world politics in a manner that 
resembles as closely as possible the methods of natural science, cannot avoid normative 
assumptions in the selection of what data is important, in interpreting that data, and in 
articulating why such research is significant. There was a time when such a statement 
would have been highly controversial. For some approaches within IR it is still 
controversial today. However, powerful criticisms of the positivist bias towards 
explanation, objectivity and the fact/value separation, have been unleashed in IR that take 
the radical edge off of this opening statement.15  
Put simply, poststructuralists and positivists have different conceptions of knowledge, ask 
different research questions and differ over what should be studied and how it should be 
studied. The former believe that the positivist notion of objectivity that depends on an 
assumption that there is a world out there—existing independently of theory—to be 
discovered and accessed is not plausible. Instead, poststructuralists argue that our theories 
define what we see as the external world; therefore each theory will define what counts as the 
facts,16 and each worldview will present some forms of action as ‘natural’, and others as 
unthinkable.17  The poststructuralist premise resonates with this paper’s focus on the political 
struggle over the concept of Irish neutrality and the hypothesis that assumptions within IR 
theory drive the elite claims made about the ‘reality’ of Irish neutrality. The poststructuralist 
aim is to investigate ‘the interrelationship of power and representational practices that 
elevate one truth over another, that legitimate and subject one identity against another, that 
make, in short, one discourse matter more than the next’.18 This aim encourages 
consideration of a link between the theoretical dominance of neorealism (and its positivist, 
essentialist ontology and foundational epistemology)19 in the discipline of IR, and the 
dominance of the neorealist-inspired Unneutral Ireland thesis over the social constructivist 
thesis supporting the practice of Irish neutrality. These poststructuralist premises and aims 
are realised through the method of deconstruction.  
Deconstruction  
For many deconstructionists, deconstruction is not a ‘method’ because ‘deconstruction has to 
do with what cannot be formalized or anticipated’.20 Indeed, ‘the question “what is 
deconstruction?” is itself evidence of a serious naivety, for deconstruction is, above all 
perhaps, a questioning of the “is”, a concern with what remains to be thought, with what 
                                                                                                                                          
constructivist approaches to international theory’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The 
globalisation of world politics (Oxford, 2001), 224–49: 227.  
15 Der Derian, ‘Post-Theory’, 55–6. 
16 Smith, ‘Reflectivist and constructivist approaches’, 227. 
17 Louise Phillips and Marianne W. Jorgensen, Discourse analysis as theory and method (London, 2002), 6.  
18 Der Derian, ‘Post-Theory’, 59. 
19 Mark Neufeld, ‘Interpretation and the “Science” of international relations’, Millennium 17 (3) (1988), 39–61: 
51. See also Smith, ‘Reflectivist and constructivist approaches’, 225. 
20 Nicholas Royle, ‘What is Deconstruction?’, in Nicholas Royle (ed.), Deconstructions: a user’s guide 
(Basingstoke, 2000), 1–13: 6. 
cannot be thought within the present’.21 That said, one of the key ideas associated with 
deconstruction is a strategy concerned with conceptual oppositions, e.g. myth/reality, 
male/female, same/other, rational/nonrational, and more particularly with the 
acknowledgement that these oppositions always entail a ‘violent hierarchy’: the first term is, 
in a specific context that must itself be demonstrated, privileged over its supposed opposite;22 
‘the second term in each pair is considered the negative, corrupt, undesirable version of the 
first, a fall away from it’.23 The first move in deconstructing the opposition is to overthrow the 
hierarchy. In the next phase, this reversal must be displaced, with the winning term put 
‘under erasure’: ‘Derrida’s method consists of showing how the privileged term is held in 
place by the force of a dominant metaphor and not, as it might seem, by any conclusive 
logic’.24  
How does the deconstruction in this paper proceed? It starts with a conceptual binary: 
comprised of the dominant Unneutral Ireland thesis that claims that Irish neutrality is a 
‘myth’ and the subjugated Irish neutrality thesis that embodies the opposing claim that Irish 
neutrality exists.25 The ‘violent hierarchy’ is made explicit in the texts under deconstruction: 
the Unneutral thesis constructs a ‘genuine’, ‘established’ concept of neutrality (the key to 
Unneutral Ireland’s assertions about the mythical status of Irish neutrality) that is superior to 
Irish neutrality’s concept of ‘active’ neutrality—‘the notion of “active neutrality” involves a 
contradiction in terms and a disregard for the established meaning of the concept’.26 This 
micro-level, qualitative hierarchy in the texts is mirrored at the macro-level of the 
international relations discipline because within that discipline, the neorealist paradigm is 
qualitatively and quantitatively privileged over nonrealist approaches.27 Such overwhelming 
bias in the IR discipline may partly explain why the Unneutral thesis has escaped criticism 
and is readily cited, whilst the Irish neutrality thesis is largely ignored.  
Perspectivism  
This paper replaces Derrida’s ‘dominant metaphor’ as the force behind the privileged term in 
the conceptual binary with the force of a ‘dominant IR theoretical worldview’—neo-realism. 
This perspectivist approach28 should not prove to be too controversial because it resonates 
with premises employed in political philosophy, e.g. Hyland argues, ‘questions can be raised 
about the acceptability of a norm or principle by demonstrating that on analysis the principle 
is only meaningful against a background of theoretical assumptions that are themselves 
questionable and open to debate’.29 The corollary of this perspectivist deconstruction is that 
neither discourse can claim the sole, logical ‘truth’ about Irish neutrality—in the sense that 
each thesis on Irish neutrality is theory-dependent, each is equally ‘true’ and equally 
contingent. Pre-empting accusations of relativism, this paper takes the position (discussed 
later) that the social constructivist account of Irish neutrality is more relevant and appropriate 
for the purposes of understanding the dynamics of public opinion on Irish neutrality 
compared to the neo-realist ‘unneutral’ discourse.  
THE DOMINANCE OF THE UNNEUTRAL DISCOURSE  
Having cited the qualitative hierarchy of the Unneutral thesis’s concept of neutrality, 
attention now turns to the quantitative hegemony of the ‘unneutral’ discourse in the 
academic literature and print media. The following titles and sub-titles of academic journal 
and newspaper articles (emphasis added) illustrate the elite-led discourse that Ireland’s 
neutrality is not ‘real’, but a ‘myth’:  
                                                 
21 Royle, ‘What is Deconstruction?’, 7. 
  ‘Neutrality and the Irish Republic: myth or reality?’—Trevor C. Salmon, The Round 
Table 290 (1984), 205–15.  
 ‘A myth of “traditional neutrality” developed from the Irish decision to be a non-
belligerent in the Second World War’—Garret FitzGerald, Irish Times, 21 October 1997.  
 ‘Casting off the imaginary cloak of neutrality’—Stephen Collins, Sunday Tribune, 
23 March 2003.  
 ‘Our sham neutrality has finally been exposed’—Stephen Collins, Sunday Tribune, 
30 March 2003.  
 ‘Wartime neutrality theoretical rather than real’—Garret FitzGerald, Irish Times, 29 
January 2005.  
 
The Unneutral Ireland thesis set out to test ‘whether the Irish interpretation and 
understanding of these concepts [neutrality/nonalignment] are legitimate’30 and concluded 
that ‘Ireland certainly is, and has been “unneutral ”’.31 The thesis has been cited throughout 
several decades of academic literature that supports both the analytical approach—the 
construction of a concept of ‘classic(al)’ neutrality to serve as the yardstick to evaluate Irish 
neutrality32—and the conclusion that Irish neutrality is a myth. For example, in the 1995 
edition of this journal, referring to Unneutral Ireland, MacGinty claims ‘Trevor Salmon has 
convincingly outlined how, since independence, Ireland has failed to fulfil the criterion for a 
credible neutrality policy’.33 Kearsley quotes the Unneutral thesis arguing, ‘“the 
Irish”…deviate from the traditional characteristics of neutrality so much so that...even the 
appellations “messy”, “qualified”, and “limited” neutrality are inappropriate’.34  
In an article entitled ‘The origins, development and present status of Irish “neutrality”’, 
with a noteworthy use of inverted commas around the word ‘neutrality’, FitzGerald refers to 
the ‘seminal work Unneutral Ireland’35 and uses key arguments underpinning the Unneutral 
thesis to contend that ‘it is at least questionable whether Ireland can properly be described as 
having been “neutral”, because the scale of assistance given secretly to Britain was scarcely 
compatible with the concept of neutrality under International Law’.36 Having demonstrated 
direct support for the methodology and analytical approach underpinning the ‘unneutral’ 
thesis, FitzGerald concludes,  
it will be evident from what I have said that Irish neutrality does not conform to the 
classic definitions of neutrality. Nor is the Irish situation similar to that of other European 
neutral states such as Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, which, in their different ways, 
have had much more clear-cut concepts of neutrality than Ireland has demonstrated since 
the state was founded.37  
In the most recent academic work referencing Unneutral Ireland, Doherty opines, ‘during 
World War Two Ireland’s neutrality was extremely benevolent towards the allies to the 
extent that it is doubtful whether Ireland should be described as neutral or simply non-
belligerent’.38 Thus, there is considerable support for the Unneutral thesis in the academic 
literature and the print media—even though this appears to go against the grain of public 
opinion on neutrality—that constitutes a relative but significant hegemony over the Irish 
neutrality thesis. Interestingly, a neo-realist bias, similarly unreflective of public opinion, is 
said to be present in the mainstream media discourses on neutrality in other neutral states, 
e.g. Ståhlberg notes that in Finland ‘the independent press plays a restrictive role [in terms of 
representing public opinion], because its argumentation is related to the “realist” position 
with regard to neutrality’.39  
NEOREALISM AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: SOME PARADIGM FEATURES  
Acknowledging the vigorous debate over the definition and content of the distinct IR 
theoretical traditions,40 the following synopsis of key features of neo-realism and social 
constructivism serves as an indicative checklist to help identify the assumptions 
distinguishing the competing theses on Irish neutrality. Certain propositions in a paradigm 
are more important than others, either because the adherents to the paradigm claim that these 
propositions have greater theoretical explanatory power or because they are what distinguish 
the paradigm from rival paradigms.41 Neo-realism and social constructivism are conceived of 
as existing in relation to each other,42 and some would argue in binary opposition to each 
other.43 These academic dynamics feature in the texts under deconstruction in the current 
paper and guide the discussion of the characteristics in each of the following summaries.  
Realism and neo-realism  
In his typology, Donnelly delineates structural realists who emphasise international 
anarchy,44 from ‘classical’ or biological realists who emphasise human nature and 
state motivation.45 Structural realists are called ‘neo-realists’ in an effort to emphasise 
their ‘newness’ and the differences from earlier realists arising from their strong 
structuralism. Whilst neo-realists are quick to point out that their structural theory of 
international politics does not concern foreign policy—‘particular, unit-based, 
internal explanations or forces’46—the epistemological, ontological and substantive 
assumptions of neo-realism evidently inform academic analyses of foreign policy, 
including those on Irish neutrality. This important connection between theoretical 
accounts of international politics at one level and foreign policy analysis at another is 
reflected in one of the central tenets of critical international relations theory cited by 
Neufeld, in that ‘an interpretive analysis of regulative international institutions 
cannot be conducted independently of an interpretative analysis of the global order 
itself, and the latter cannot be effectuated successfully without attention being paid to 
the ideological component of the reproduction of that order.’47  
Although there are a number of substantive differences between neo-realism and realism, 
the two paradigms are collapsed into one ‘(neo)realism’ for the purposes of the 
deconstruction in the current paper. This is because both are relevant to understanding the 
most significant claims made in relation to Irish neutrality in the Unneutral Ireland thesis 
and they also share the same ontological and epistemological premises. More specifically, all 
realisms are positivist—‘neorealism is by, of and for positivists’;48 and ‘rational choice’ in 
inspiration49—‘realist and neorealist theories are avowedly rationalistic, accepting…a 
“substantive” conception of rationality’.50 Realist and neo-realist writing is explanatory:51 in 
particular, neo-realists wish to be seen as scientific, which is why they look to micro-
economic rational choice analysis for methodological guidance, whereas the realists are 
more concerned with policy prescription.52 Both are state-centric, perceiving states as unitary 
actors,53 and both focus on the concepts of power and structure in order to explain the 
behaviour of states.  
CONCEPTS OF POWER, STRUCTURE AND THE ‘BALANCE OF POWER’  
Turning to the more substantive features of realism and neo-realism, each is centrally 
concerned with power conceived in terms of material factors and military hardware, the 
combined capability of a state that can be counted and measured. It is the idea that 
international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure that 
signals neo-realism’s fundamental departure from traditional realism.54 Neo-realism’s use of 
the concept of power as a defining characteristic of this structure means that the distribution 
of power across states and changes in that distribution help to define structures and changes 
in states.55 In this respect, ‘great powers’ are marked off from other states by the combined 
capabilities (or power) they have.56 For neo-realists, then, the principal determinant of state 
behaviour is the underlying distribution of material capabilities across states in the 
international system, a determinant that gives states their animating survival motive, which 
in turn drives balance-of-power competition.57 These concepts of ‘materialist/militarist power’ 
and ‘balance of power’ drive mainstream analyses of neutrality in IR, and both feature in the 
analysis of Irish neutrality in the Unneutral thesis.  
A key criticism of the neorealist focus on structure is that it ignores the role of human will 
and the notion of agency (one of the key considerations of social constructivism) in 
international politics. As Neufeld surmises, ‘in short, positivist-inspired mainstream IR 
theory can be seen as a major social force contributing to the maintenance of the 
“ideologically frozen relations of dependence”, an effect it accomplishes through the 
“reification” of the global order, i.e. by presenting that order as a “thing” standing apart from 
and independently of human will or action’.58  
THE AGENT–STRUCTURE DEBATE AND ESCHEWAL OF PUBLIC OPINION  
Human agency and the possibility of change in international relations is the first element of 
the so-called ‘agent-structure’ debate in IR. Due to the dominance of neorealism in the 
discipline, ‘currently IR theory provides much more insight into structure than agency’.59 This 
focus on structure over agency effectively ignores the interrelationship between the two, and 
perceives developments that take place in domestic civil society, or at the individual level, as 
having little or no meaning at the international level.60 Neorealist structuralism presents 
hierarchic domestic and anarchic international politics as qualitatively different realms that 
must be studied with logically incompatible theoretical frameworks.61 Thus, neorealist 
accounts of world politics emphasising ‘structure’ over ‘agency’ tend to draw deep 
distinctions between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ politics and, crucially, are also more 
likely to ignore the role of public opinion in foreign policy.  
Realists, including Morganthau, the founding father of realism, sought to erase the 
concept of the public from foreign policy analyses in order to construct ‘a theory of foreign 
policy which aims at rationality’.
62 
Whilst Waltz appears to chastise Morganthau for 
confusing the problem of explaining foreign policy with the problem of developing a theory 
of international politics,
63 
regardless of whether the ambition is to explain ‘foreign policy’ or 
‘international politics’, the failure of realists and neorealists to consider the public as a 
variable in either phenomenon is problematic and controversial. Arguably these realist and 
neo-realist themes embedded in mainstream analyses of foreign policy in IR have 
contributed to the failure of the Unneutral Ireland thesis to consider public opinion in the 
conception and analysis of Irish neutrality.  
As will be discussed later, within the discipline of IR, critical theorists and social 
constructivists are counteracting the (neo)realist desire to extract or ignore the human 
variable by calling for a more human-centered concept of security; however, there are 
several other political theories and normative arguments justifying consideration of human 
agency and public opinion in foreign policy analysis, for example, Marxist theory or 
participatory democratic theory.
64 
In addition, Brown points out that theorists of decision-
making have undermined the idea that foreign policy is radically different from domestic 
politics and the neorealist emphasis on the irrelevance of domestic factors is undermined 
somewhat by the phenomenon of the ‘democratic peace’.
65 
The lesser emphasis of ‘critical’ 
social constructivists on the international–domestic divide and their consideration of human 
agency in security and international politics may offer a better explanation of foreign policy, 
and in particular, the phenomenon of popular adherence to neutrality in the face of European 
elite hostility.
66 
Thus, Irish neutrality’s consideration of human agency and public opinion as 
key constituents of the concept of Irish neutrality may signify a fundamental theoretical 
advantage over the (neo)realist Unneutral thesis in attempts to understand the dynamics of 
public opinion on Irish neutrality.  
 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM(S)  
Critical theory and poststructuralism arose in reaction to the intellectual hegemony of 
neorealism,
67
mainly because the materialism and rationalism of the prevailing theories left 
little room for the social dimensions of international life—‘thanks to constructivists, the 
social, historical and normative have returned to the centre stage of debate’.
68 
As mentioned 
earlier, McSweeney posits social constructivism in binary opposition to realism:  
this perspective can be illustrated by particular studies relevant to international security, 
which employ a common rejection of key tenants of realism,a subscription to a broadly 
sociological approach, and a common emphasis on the reflexive, cognitive element in the 
determination and explanation of actors’ behaviour.
69 
 
Although this binary opposition helps strategically in terms of identifying assumptions in the 
two theses on Irish neutrality, it is important to note that there are significantly different 
variants of ‘social constructivism’.
70 
 
Wendtian social constructivism  
Some social constructivist approaches, like that of Alex Wendt, affirm realist principles of 
method and support a structural, state-centric perspective, simply conceptualising structure 
as a social rather than a material phenomenon.
71 
While neo-realists accept the ‘anarchy 
problematic’, Wendtian social constructivism sets itself the seemingly critical task of 
elucidating ways in which the anarchy problematic serves particular kinds of interests, and 
closes down particular sorts of arguments.
72 
By purporting to study the sociology of structure 
and anarchy, however, Wendtian social constructivists are, in effect, maintaining the 
hegemony of these core neorealist concepts as determinants of international politics and 
foreign policy, and by corollary, the separation of the domestic from the international realm, 
including the dismissal of the former.
73 
 
Identity is central to Wendtian constructivism because the type of anarchy in the system 
depends not only on the concept of security actors have, but also on how they construe their 
identity in relation to others.
74 
Identity is the link between environmental structures and 
interests.
75 
Although identity is at the core of Wendtian social constructivism, it is conceived 
of only at the level of the state with the result that the domestic process of identity formation 
is ignored and change in identity is theorised to occur exogenously.
76 
So Wendtian 
constructivism appears to simply add values, identities and interests as elements of the 
structure of international politics— it does not repudiate the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of the (neo)realist paradigm. These shortcomings ‘lead us to reach particular 
conclusions whilst barring us from considering alternative possibilities. Thus, the starting 
point of Wendt’s constructivism already encompasses within it the scope of possible 
outcomes of the analysis’.
77 
For example, social constructivists’ (and realists’) preoccupation 
with the state prevents them from seeing a security role for the sub-state human collectivities 
at the domestic level.
78 
 
Finally, in claiming to ‘build a bridge’ between the rationalists/realists and the 
poststructuralists/reflectivists in IR theory,
79 
and ‘seizing the middle ground’ in international 
relations,
80 
Wendtian social constructivism proceeds to marginalise other critical approaches. 
Persram, in particular, objects to this  
‘strategic use of social constructivism’, which is part and parcel of the acceptance of 
constructivism. Representing it as the most significant ‘radical’ approach makes an 
engagement with (other) critical approaches seem superfluous and thus effectively 
marginalizes them. This is confirmed by portrayals of the theoretical landscape which sees 
Realism at one end of the spectrum and constructivism at the other, leaving no room for 
(other) critical thinking. Either it will be subsumed under the constructivist label or it will 
be entirely dismissed…Constructivism is significant not only because it is considered 
central but also because of the possibility of deploying it strategically to exclude more 
radical perspectives from consideration.
81 
 
A truly radical shake up of the dominant discourses in IR (and those on Irish neutrality) 
requires a vigorously non-realist social constructivist perspective embodying a more critical, 
postmodern, epistemological approach. Such an approach must move away from those who 
maintain that truth claims can be decided by intersubjective discourses, and towards those 
who do not share that view (many poststructuralists).
82 
 
Critical, reflexive social constructivism  
Reflexivity is a key concept stratifying Wendtian constructivism and the more critical social 
constructivists. As Phillips explains:  
many social constructionists, including discursive psychologists, view their own studies as 
discursive constructions that do not provide the only possible representation of the world 
but, rather, just one version which is part of the discursive struggle within the research 
field in question. Scientific knowledge is seen as productive. As with all other discourses, 
scientific discourse produces knowledge, social relations and identities. This 
understanding of knowledge production stands in contrast to the objectivist view of 
science to be found in positivism, whereby knowledge is seen as a reflection of reality. As 
a result of their distinctive understanding of knowledge, social constructionists often 
emphasise reflexivity—that is, they attempt to apply their theories to their own research 
practice.83  
Reflexivity co-exists with the critical social constructivists’ emphasis on agency in the 
agent–structure debate in IR. Substantively, the emphasis on agency implies the freedom of 
an agent to choose to act in a manner contrary to that determined by Waltz’s structural model 
of politics. A theoretical emphasis on agency informs the reflexive sociology of international 
politics articulated by McSweeney, which sees the social order as a fluid, unstable reality 
constituted by humans relating through the medium of habits. Reflexive social constructivists 
argue that such a world is held together and made coherent by concepts likewise fluid, 
unstable and embedded in human practices, in sharp contrast to the understanding of social 
concepts in the objectivist tradition of political science.84 Finally, a reflexive theory of the 
social order supports the moral and emancipatory impulse of a critical theory of international 
politics, which aims to expose the contingency of all social arrangements and the human 
choice and interests that gave rise to them.85 Indeed, what justifies the ‘critical’ label of the 
new school of ‘critical security studies’ that has recently emerged in opposition to the realist 
school of ‘security studies’ is a concern with human emancipation: ‘critical theorists have 
attempted to re-establish a privileged position for the human subject in the face of the 
dehumanisation implicit in structuralism’.86  
CONCEPTS OF SECURITY  
Concepts of security provide a way of linking together many areas of theory and analysis 
within IR
87 
and they also serve to illustrate the differences between competing paradigms of 
neorealism and social constructivism and competing concepts of Irish neutrality. Deepening 
our understandings of security involves ‘investigating the implications and possibilities that 
result from seeing security as a concept that derives from different understandings of what 
politics is and can be all about, and specifically, politics on a global scale’.
88 
Traditionally 
states are the primary referent object in the security debate, not individual human beings.
89 
By excluding people from the discussion of state security (and neutrality) we simplify the 
model, and escape the task of investigating security in all its complex, value-laden respects 
as a concept that has meaning only in relation to people and their needs.
90 
McSweeney 
articulates the call to adopt a deeper, human-centred idea of security in place of the state 
focus, and a broader concept instead of a narrow, militaristic one.
91 
Similarly, Ayoob argues 
for a concept of security that ‘must go beyond the traditional realist definition of security and 
overcome its external orientation and military bias’,
92 
‘to include domestic and non-military 
dimensions’.
93 
Because ‘different worldviews and discourses about politics deliver different 
views and discourses about security’,
94 
and different concepts of security in turn produce 
different concepts of neutrality, the critical social constructivist would construct a more 
human-centred concept of neutrality than a Wendtian social constructivist and would 
prioritise these dimensions in an analysis of Irish neutrality.  
In conclusion, the purpose of summarising the key paradigm features of neorealism and 
social constructivism is so that we can imagine what a neo-realist analysis of Irish neutrality 
would focus on and would prioritise as key variables compared to a critical social 
constructivist analysis. In summary, a neo-realist approach would conceive of power in 
terms of military capabilities, would empirically measure these factors and would designate 
the appropriate role and foreign-policy options of the state. From these assumptions, the neo-
realist would then proceed to analyse the state’s foreign policy. More specifically, a neo-
realist analysis of neutrality would view the balance-of-power assumption as a critical 
variable and would ignore the role of sub-state actors and public opinion. To be seen as 
scientific, a neo-realist would construct an essentialist, legalistic concept of neutrality using 
positivist methods, gathering empirical evidence designed to support claims of objectivity, 
and would write with an explanatory tone.  
Social constructivists would consider the role of identity, and its malleability as a social 
form, as significant for IR theory and substantive international relations.
95 
A social 
constructivist approach would emphasise agency, understand structure in cognitive rather 
than exclusively material terms, consider identity and interests as important variables and 
view the international order as a construction of actors. A more critical social constructivist 
would offer a reflexive, qualified-foundational analysis of Irish neutrality, incorporate the 
role of public and sub-state actors into the concept of Irish neutrality and focus on normative 
political issues in the debate, given the emancipatory goal of critical social constructivist 
writing.  
Table 1 summarises the binary positions occupied by the Unneutral thesis and the Irish 
neutrality thesis in relation to meta-issues of ontology, epistemology, methodology and 
approach, as well as the specific variables related to the IR theoretical assumptions that direct 
the analysis and conclusions of each thesis.  
THE DECONSTRUCTION  
Drawing attention to the IR theoretical assumptions where appropriate, this paper will 
highlight (1) the differences in approaches employed in each of the respective Unneutral 
Ireland and Irish Neutrality discourses, i.e. essentialist v anti-essentialist; foundational v 
‘qualified foundational’; positivist v reflexivist; objective v normative; and explanatory v 
emancipatory. These approaches in turn give rise to  
Table 1: Deconstruction summary—Thesis, paradigm, approach and  
variables 
 
(2) the differences in the nature of the concepts of neutrality presented, i.e. a ‘true’, 
measurable fact v a possible, flexible process; external v internal dynamics; wartime v 
peacetime concepts; passive v active concepts. They also give rise to (3) the different levels 
of importance attached to the variables common to each analysis, i.e. identity and discourses 
(the latter will not be discussed in this paper due to word-count restraints). The IR paradigm 
also influences (4) the level of salience attached to variables common to each neutrality 
concept, i.e. defence capabilities, sovereignty and law. Finally, the paradigm has an effect on 
(5) the selection of variables that have a significant role in drawing conclusions on the 
existence and credibility of Irish neutrality that are exclusive to each analysis, i.e. the neo-
realist factors of balance-of-power, protective umbrella and the primacy of military power v 
the social constructivist factors of identity, the role of sub-state agents and public support.  
Essentialist versus anti-essentialist  
Essentialism ‘is most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the 
invariable and fixed properties which define the “whatness” of a given entity’.96 In cognitive 
psychology, essentialism refers to people’s everyday tendency to assume, often 
unconsciously, that objects in nature have hidden essential properties that determine what 
kind of objects they are. In political science, essentialism encapsulates the idea that essential 
or natural givens precede the processes of social determination97 and in this respect, 
essentialism relates to the ontological position that the world exists independently of 
perception. In a classic illustration of an essentialist approach, the Unneutral thesis argues, 
‘it is worthwhile to pursue the search for the essence of non-alignment, since, if a concept is 
to be used, it should have a clearly understood content’.98 The Unneutral thesis contrives an 
essentialist concept of neutrality using positivist methods. It states:  
what had emerged as the essence of neutrality was abstention, the inviolability of neutral 
territory, and impartiality. Each of these aspects had associated with it a number of rights 
and duties99…including impartiality, the recognition of neutral status by belligerents, the 
disavowal of external help, the freedom of decision and action in the political economic 
and military spheres…100  
These fixed, ‘essential’ components of the Unneutral thesis’s concept of neutrality contrast 
with the fluid concept of ‘active’ neutrality that ‘relates to a wide range of activities and 
skills’
101 
described in the Irish neutrality thesis. The ontological character of the latter 
concept means neutrality  
is not a fact, but an accomplishment. That is to say, it is more like child-rearing than 
childbirth, like trade rather than a trade agreement. This may seem obvious to some, but the 
static, objective idea of neutrality is very pervasive.
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Foundational versus ‘qualified’ foundational  
 
A foundationalist position is one that thinks that all truth claims about some feature of the 
world can be judged true or false,
103 
a position that is intimately linked with the essentialist 
ontology described above. Der Derian refers to  
the continuing domination of a philosophical realism in IR—from its logical positivist to 
rational choice forms—which holds that the purest, most parsimonious statement most 
accurately, usefully, authentically expresses a thought or reflects an event. At the level of 
common sense, they suggest a natural preference for conceptual rigor and clarity.104  
Such premises underpin the Unneutral claims in relation to Irish neutrality that are expressed 
in a strong foundationalist tone:  
‘the concept of Irish neutrality’ is not saved ‘since (as has been clearly established and 
demonstrated) genuine neutrality is not to be equated with mere non-belligerency, or non-
alliance membership…moreover, even if the concept of ‘military neutrality’ were 
compatible with neutrality as properly understood (which it is not), the equation of 
‘military neutrality’ with neutrality per se is singularly inappropriate in the Irish case’.105  
A ‘qualified’ foundationalism described by McSweeney represents ‘the implicit 
epistemology of the emerging trend in sociological theory and research and of much of the 
work in international relations theory that can be identified as ‘social constructionist’ in its 
approach’.106 This is evident in ‘the sociological premise’ used in the Irish neutrality thesis to 
analyse neutrality: ‘if people perceive things as real then they are real in their 
consequences’.107  
Positivist versus reflexivist  
Theoretical reflexivity includes ‘a willingness to be open about our philosophical and 
political starting points, and facing the challenge of clarifying “how our commitments and 
values are consistent with our (meta-)theoretical starting points”’.108 From the outset, the 
author of the Irish neutrality thesis explains, his academic discipline ‘starts from certain 
moral assumptions which function to direct the progress of work and the selection of 
evidence’ and acknowledges his position as a student of ‘the politics of peacemaking’.109 
Whilst the Irish neutrality thesis is prefaced with the proviso ‘we have no truths to impart, 
only a case to advance respectfully’, the tone of the Unneutral thesis is the traditional one of 
‘several decades of security studies that involved “telling it as it is”—“it” being a realist 
account of the purported state(s) of the world’.110 With unrelenting positivism, no position is 
described or admitted to in the Unneutral thesis, and nor are any paradigmatic assumptions 
acknowledged.  
Formal, objective, explanatory versus critical, normative, emancipatory  
The Unneutral Ireland thesis follows the formal, positivist ‘scientific’ method of creating a 
model of variables and applying it to test the case of Irish neutrality. It proceeds with  
a conceptual analysis aimed at identifying the true nature of neutrality;111 the discussion in 
this and the preceding chapter makes it possible to identify the most significant variables 
associated with neutrality…in chapter five, these variables will be applied specifically to 
Ireland in the years of its great test, namely the period of the Second World War.112  
From a poststructuralist perspective, the concept of neutrality—like all political concepts—is 
essentially contested, but this notion is normally obscured in the explanatory tone of 
neorealist writing, such as in this exemplar from the Unneutral thesis:  
For neutrality per se, as demonstrated earlier, certain conditions must be met; and by 
utilizing them one can give content to the concept. The fact that the concept is often 
wrongly applied, or that the conditions may be difficult to attain in the contemporary 
world, is not a ground for abandoning it, especially since the term is still widely used, not 
least by states themselves, and does provide a useful yardstick against which to analyse 
the policies of such states.113  
In this seemingly ‘objective’ analysis, the Unneutral thesis simply takes the neutrality of 
other states as a ‘given’, referring to them as states that ‘are commonly identified as neutral 
or non-aligned in the literature’, that are ‘universally regarded as such’,114 in the formulation 
of the so-called ‘genuine’ concept of neutrality.  
The analysis of these [neutral] states’ [Austria, Sweden and Switzerland] policies and 
attitudes leads to an extrapolation of their essential position, which, taken together with 
the key characteristics of neutrality and non-alignment identified in the previous chapter, 
forms the basis of a model against which the Irish case is examined in subsequent 
chapters.115  
It is on the basis of these assumptions, approach and model that the Unneutral thesis argues, 
‘the application of the variables, suggests that such orthodoxy [that Ireland is neutral] must 
be questioned. At best, evidence in support of it is equivocal’.116 The assumption of the 
neutrality of the European states is crucial, because applying all of the same criteria on 
which Irish neutrality is evaluated to the types of neutrality exercised by the European states 
would result in those European states being deemed ‘unneutral’ too. Nonetheless, the tone 
employed in the conclusion imparts an unquestionable ‘truth’—that Ireland is ‘unneutral’: 
‘the Irish, then, have consistently and significantly failed to measure up to the principal 
prerequisites “of” or “for” neutrality...despite the shibboleth of neutrality, and the claims of 
the Irish themselves, Ireland has never been truly neutral’.117  
By contrast, the Irish neutrality thesis is more concerned with truth claims regarding 
neutrality in the public debate, referring to the negative ‘image of neutrality popularized by 
all the major military powers’. This thesis argues that their ‘tacit, multilateral agreement to 
downgrade neutrality has undoubtedly succeeded in lowering its status and making it 
difficult for an aspiring neutral to win public support at home and international recognition 
abroad for a policy often seen as “indifferent”, “self-centred”, “opportunist”, “short-
sighted”’.118 The thesis attests that ‘EPC…functions to create a climate which will gradually 
persuade the other NATO members to drop their fears of US reaction and NATO weakness 
and to move gradually through stages towards a defence alliance’,119 and it demonstrates how 
certain claims made by elites or the Irish government in relation to Irish neutrality ‘can be a 
ploy to distort the term’120 and how several of these claims amount to ‘a crude tactic to 
abandon neutrality by defining it beyond the bounds of possibility’.121  
Criticising the ‘sizeable body of feeling, innuendo and unargued comment in the writings 
of some politicians, journalists and historians who are clearly unhappy with Ireland’s 
ambiguous position’,122 the Irish neutrality thesis seeks to consider alternatives to those 
presented in the dominant discourse and asks ‘by what reason are we therefore invited to join 
a military alliance? There are other possibilities which are not presented and there is the 
moral dimension which is ignored’.123 Finally, the Irish neutrality discourse refers to other 
neutral states in order to argue for a new normative concept of neutrality;124 it prompts 
neutrals to evaluate the policy of neutrality in terms of its ability to ‘serve the cause of 
peace’.125  
External versus internal  
The notion of external and internal factors relate to the agent–structure debate in IR. The 
Unneutral thesis deliberates on the external constraints on the Irish state that are assumed to 
determine a state’s ability to be neutral: ‘there is always the question of how “free” any 
decision by a small, weak state really is in an interdependent world, and particularly for a 
state like Ireland’.
126 
In the best tradition of structural realism the Unneutral thesis argues 
that ‘Irish non-belligerency was only really possible because of strategic factors outside the 
Irish government’s control’.
127 
The Irish neutrality thesis, however, attributes agency to the 
state and rejects the determinacy of structure: ‘neutrality…depends on a multitude of factors 
outside the control of a neutral state—such as geography, resources, belligerent needs and 
strategies—and on many within its control which can be used to manipulate the external 
factors’.
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Passive versus active  
Given the belief in the neo-realist import of structure over agency as the main determinant of 
neutrality, it is not surprising that the Unneutral thesis, having succeeded in identifying the 
‘true’ nature of neutrality,129 characterises it as inherently negative and ‘passive’. This thesis 
contends that ‘the classical view has been that the ambience, and indeed definition, of 
neutrality cannot be given without invoking the concept of the negative’, and that ‘political 
passivity was the main characteristic’ of neutrality.130 By contrast, the Irish neutrality thesis, 
entertaining the notion of agency in the concept of neutrality, proposes an ‘active’ concept of 
neutrality that ‘relates to a wide range of activities and skills and requires active public 
participation’.131  
Wartime versus peacetime  
The weight given to the legal aspect of neutrality indicates the degree of flexibility and the 
nature of the concept of neutrality in each thesis, but also underpins contestations over the 
wartime and peacetime connotations of the concept. The Irish neutrality thesis argues that 
the static, objective idea of neutrality is ‘indicated particularly by the weight given to the 
legal definition or the wartime function of neutrality’132 and rejects the legal constraints on the 
nature of the concept: ‘international law is a poor guide to the accomplishment of neutrality 
strategy’.133 Instead, the Irish neutrality thesis conceptualises neutrality as a peacetime policy: 
‘for it is only an involved, active, peacetime neutrality which will contribute to a reduction 
of the tensions leading to war and to the creation of the conditions at home which may 
mitigate its effects’.134  
The Unneutral thesis denies this active, peacetime concept on the grounds of international 
law strictures, claiming ‘there is more confusion in the use of the word “neutrality”, which is 
not an appropriate description for a peacetime policy, but is widely used as if it were. Such 
problems are extenuated when one is seeking to classify states whose official policy is non-
participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming for neutrality in the event of war’.
135 
Articulating a neo-realist, legal positivism, the thesis relies heavily on the legal concept as a 
benchmark to measure and ultimately reject Irish neutrality, despite the fact that every other 
European neutral also failed to live up to the legal concept during the Second World War: ‘it 
is of major significance that, contrary to the cited literature and much Irish opinion, there is a 
clear distinction to be drawn between the Irish position(s)…and the requirements…of the 
classical theory of neutrality, as understood by international law and convention...’
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NEO-REALIST FEATURES IN THE UNNEUTRAL IRELAND THESIS: MILITARIST 
POWER, THE STATE AS UNITARY ACTOR, AND THE CONCEPTS OF ‘BALANCE 
OF POWER’ AND ‘PROTECTIVE UMBRELLA’ 
 
The Unneutral Ireland thesis prioritises distinctly neorealist determinates in its claim that 
‘neutrality relates as much, if not more, to factors such as location, strength, and the balance 
of power as to aspiration and law’.137 ‘Realists have a one dimensional view of power as 
military power: it is reduced to counting the number of troops, tanks, aircraft and naval ships 
a country possesses in the belief that this translates into the ability to get other actors to do 
something they might not otherwise do’.138 This measurement of power is seen in the devotion 
of a large part of the Unneutral thesis to the provision of defence expenditure figures, 
inventories of military equipment and Defence Forces personnel numbers.139 These data serve 
as ‘evidence’ of Ireland’s failures with respect to its ‘due diligence’ and ‘disavowal of 
external help’ criteria of neutrality that are discussed later on. The Unneutral thesis also 
provides sets of military inventories ostensibly measuring the capabilities of other neutral 
states in order to comparatively evaluate ‘the Irish’ exercise of neutrality.  
The realist state-centric assumption posits states as the most important actors in world 
politics and conceives of states as unitary actors. The notion of the state as a unitary actor is 
inherent throughout the Unneutral thesis, as the primary agent referred to is an entity called 
‘the Irish’: e.g. ‘the Irish, then, have consistently and significantly failed to measure up to the 
principal prerequisites “of” or “for” neutrality...despite the shibboleth of neutrality, and the 
claims of the Irish themselves, Ireland has never been truly neutral’.140 There is a complete 
absence of the notion of sub-state actors or levels of analysis in the thesis.  
The Unneutral thesis puts forward the argument ‘that a basic condition of neutrality is the 
existence of a balance of power’,141 from which flows the concept of the ‘implicit “protective 
umbrella”’.142 Using ‘statistical evidence’143 of Irish defence expenditure144 the thesis claims, ‘the 
Irish relied on a protective umbrella supplied by the British’145 and that ‘during the war there 
was no consistent Irish disavowel of external help…there still remained a belief in the 
protective umbrella’.146 The concept of the protective umbrella is used in the thesis to support 
the argument that Irish neutrality fails to satisfy the criteria of ‘disavowel of external help’,147 
thus rendering Ireland ‘unneutral’.  
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST FEATURES IN THE IRISH NEUTRALITY THESIS: 
CRITICAL AND ANTI-REALIST, THE IDENTITY OF THE STATE AND PEOPLE, 
AND THE ROLE OF SUB-STATE ACTORS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT 
 
Echoing the aims of critical international relations theory, the Irish neutrality thesis identifies 
the hegemony of neo-realism and seeks to counteract its objectivity, conceived of as 
‘sedimented power’:  
although realism proper, in the discipline of international politics, is only one among 
competing intellectual perspectives, emphasizing the balance of power as the central 
factor in stability and change, in fact it is often advanced as a legitimation of existing 
relations, as a justification of the existing system, defining any attempt at reform or 
change as impossible or misguided.148  
Irish neutrality’s reflexive approach to Irish neutrality rejects the acceptance of the ‘reality’ 
of neo-realism and the elite discourse on Irish neutrality and advocates normative change, 
attributing non-state actors agency in the achievement of this goal. The Irish neutrality thesis 
argues that  
a convergence of interest and virtue is a necessary condition for the successful 
implementation of a foreign policy conceived as a moral imperative. Where such 
convergence does not occur, it is the duty of mass movements and public opinion to create 
it and to oppose realism in its unacceptable form—often masquerading as realpolitik.149  
The thesis also focuses on the importance of neutrality as a facet of the identity of the Irish 
state: ‘in popular understanding it [Irish neutrality] was felt to be a general attitude to war 
and military alliance which was a feature of the identity of the state in international affairs 
and a continuing commitment of Irish governments’.150 Furthermore, this thesis argues for an 
understanding of the importance of neutrality as ‘an element of a people’s identity—however 
inconsistent it may be with the reality of foreign policy’.151  
Finally, underpinning its distinctiveness vis-à-vis the Unneutral model of neutrality, the 
Irish neutrality thesis considers the role and influence of public opinion, movements, interest 
groups and industrialists,152 casting the public as a bulwark against neorealism and 
realpolitik,153 as active participants in the concept of neutrality.154 It posits the expression of 
public consensus as the key to a successful declaration of neutrality155 and talks of 
strengthening ‘the domestic base of neutrality’,156 variables that would be unheard of in a 
neorealist analysis of neutrality.  
 
THE POLICY CONNECTION  
 
Critical theorists argue that the influence of realist assumptions extended far beyond the 
academy to structure policy-making, particularly in the United States.157 According to 
Vasquez, ‘realism has always prided itself as a theory of the world that aims to guide 
practice, and surely this is one of the reasons it has dominated international relations inquiry 
since World War II’.158 The academic sub-field of strategic studies is now considered to be 
‘primarily a policy-prescribing enterprise’, and as a result, Ayoob argues, the analysis of 
security cannot be de-linked from the interests of the great-power patrons and their own 
interest in catering to the needs and demands of policy-makers in the major capitals of the 
world.159  
‘Logically, policy direction derives from the meaning of a concept’.160 What this 
deconstruction has shown is that different IR theoretical worldviews deliver different 
meanings of the concept of Irish neutrality. Therefore, an IR theory or worldview drives the 
meaning of a concept, which in turn drives policy direction. Kruzel, for example, identifies 
two different types of neutrality adherents that he calls ‘neutrality realists’ and ‘neutrality 
idealists’, and ‘the two schools of thought yield very different foreign policy agendas’.161 But 
‘for those who believe that we live in a humanly constituted world, the distinction between 
theory and practice dissolves: theory is a form of practice is a form of theory’.162 A 
poststructuralist perspective melds neo-realism with anti-neutrality discourses; they are 
constitutive. It is useful to recall Cox’s famous edict; ‘theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose’,163 because it suggests the idea that an IR theoretical worldview is adopted for 
a purpose, out of a particular set of interests, to achieve a particular policy aim.  
Is neo-realism deliberately chosen as a worldview by European and Irish elites in order to 
de-legitimate neutrality? Certainly, advocates of the ‘unneutral’ discourse have consistently 
argued that Ireland should join NATO and/or a European Union defence alliance.164 Or is it 
the case that, as Booth puts it, ‘nobody can be blamed for their upbringing, their teachers, 
their time or their place’ and that students over the years have simply ‘been taught solely by 
those content to work within this framework?’165 Given the political stakes involved, it is most 
probably the former, for although ‘ideas—worldviews, principled beliefs and knowledge—
not only define the meaning of power but also affect the reasoning process by which state 
actors define their interests’,166 it is important to consider the corollary implied thus far, that 
‘in the concrete, policy may be driven by the interests of the actors, resulting in the reverse 
causal sequence. One’s interest in a particular policy can be a powerful motive for defining 
the concept underlying it in terms restricted to that policy’.167  
Thus, it is logical to identify the hegemonic elite interests as drivers behind the adoption 
(conscious or otherwise) of neo-realism and the promotion of its discourse undermining Irish 
neutrality.  
In this context, then, it is important to acknowledge that ‘neutrality is by its nature a 
challenge to the principal theories of international relations, because it derives from the 
possibility that the use of force in international relations can be restricted and regulated’.168 
The following quotation from a rather benign explanation of neutrality based on a neo-realist 
perspective illustrates this notion:  
Neutrality is the opposite of a typical policy followed by a small state. Given its narrow 
power base, one would assume a tendency on the part of the small state, particularly while 
confronting a great power, to try to balance its inherent weakness by drawing on external 
sources of strength. Neutrality is the opposite situation: one in which the small state, of its 
own accord, chooses to rely exclusively on internal sources of strength rather than on 
powerful allies.169  
Seeing neutrality in non-realist, positive terms, is ‘to see neutrality as an indication of 
evolutionary change and gradual transformation of the international system. This change 
provides choices beyond the established ones and those favoured by traditional theory—thus 
also further eroding the adequacy of this theory’.170 Therefore, the deconstruction in this paper 
(or a decision to support a social constructivist concept of neutrality) not only reverses the 
violent hierarchy of the Unneutral thesis over the Irish neutrality thesis at the micro-level of 
the selected texts, but supports a macro-level reversal and displacement of neo-realism by 
social constructivism in IR theory.  
Do neutral states’ policy-makers view neutrality in non-realist terms? An examination of 
the only Irish White Paper on foreign policy shows few obvious signs of a radical theoretical 
position on neutrality amongst Irish foreign-policy elites. Joenniemi notes a similar situation 
in other European neutral states, which is partly due to a failure to escape from the 
(neo)realist theory associated with military organisations such as NATO and also the 
political pressure to form a European Union military alliance. As he puts it:  
The neutrals themselves do not harbour counterhegemonic tendencies. They tend to argue 
their case within the framework of the dominant theory…in some cases this may have been a 
conscious choice, but more often it is because the Euro-neutrals are very much part of the 
same intellectual and politico-ideological tradition as the major powers. The neutrals also 
subscribe to the perceived universalism of the dominant theories and modes of explanation. 
They subordinate themselves to the dictates of these theories without too much concern 
about the implications for their self-understanding.171  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This paper has demonstrated that different IR theory assumptions underpin the different 
concepts of neutrality in the two theses on Irish neutrality. The deconstruction undertaken in 
this paper has displaced the hegemonic position of the ‘unneutral’ discourse on Irish 
neutrality both in the media and the academic literature. To view this article as merely a way 
to understand ‘the debate’ on Irish neutrality misses the entire point of employing a 
poststructuralist approach— although it is understandable given that the implications of the 
deconstruction may not be well received by mainstream IR and political science—because 
the poststructuralist thrust argues that the dominant truth-claims about Irish neutrality’s 
mythical, ‘unneutral’ status do not have any objective, scientific grounds. Rather, they are 
based on a (neo)realist ideology that is probably adopted out of elite political interests. Neo-
realism is not dominant in IR because it is a particularly good explanation of international 
politics or foreign policy; it is dominant because of the political structures, institutions and 
elites supporting it.  
Consequences arising from the deconstruction for (1) elite discourses in the academic 
literature and print media include placing an onus on commentators to own up to their 
metatheoretical perspective and interests; and (2) for research approaches employed in 
academic studies of Irish neutrality, there is an obligation to be aware of the metatheoretical 
biases in the literature. These biases may also lead to the formulation of inappropriate 
hypotheses in the study of public attitudes to foreign policy. For (3) the formulation of Irish 
foreign policy, the deconstruction shows that there is a need for a theory and for 
conceptualisations of neutrality that differ from the hegemonic ones; that is, for a theory that 
does not take the neutrals as mere objects of the international power game but as independent 
subjects who, through their ability to inject interests and values into international politics, are 
capable, at least to some extent, of affecting the course of developments in the international 
community.172 Finally, with regard to (4) the current status of Irish neutrality and public 
opinion, the deconstruction carried out in this paper has implications for the debate on the 
perceived credibility of Irish neutrality and the perceived ‘rationality’ of public opinion on 
Irish neutrality. It is now clear that any serious researcher must consider non-realist theories 
as an aid to understanding Irish neutrality and the dynamics of public support for Irish 
neutrality, instead of residing in the ‘rationalist’ hegemony of the (neo)realist paradigms.  
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